Abstract-In this paper, we propose a simple but robust scheme to detect denial of service attacks (including distributed denial of service attacks) by monitoring the increase of new IP addresses. Unlike previous proposals for bandwidth attack detection schemes which are based on monitoring the traffic volume, our scheme is very effective for highly distributed denial of service attacks. Our scheme exploits an inherent feature of DDoS attacks, which makes it hard for the attacker to counter this detection scheme by changing their attack signature. Our scheme uses a sequential nonparametric change point detection method to improve the detection accuracy without requiring a detailed model of normal and attack traffic. We demonstrate that we can achieve high detection accuracy on a range of different network packet traces.
I. INTRODUCTION
A denial-of-service (DoS) attack is a malicious attempt by a single person or a group of people to cripple an online service. The impact of these attacks can vary from minor inconvenience to users of a website, to serious financial losses for companies that rely on their on-line availability to do business. On February 9, 2000, Yahoo, eBay, Amazon.com, E*Trade, ZDnet, Buy.com, the FBI, and several other Web sites fell victim to DoS attacks resulting in millions of dollars in damage and inconvenience [6] [5] . As emergency and essential services become more reliant on the Internet as part of their communication infrastructure, the consequences of denial-of-service attacks could even become life-threatening. After the September 11 terrorist attack in the US, there is a growing concern that the Internet may also fall victim to terrorists. There are many indications that since September 11, the number of DoS attacks have greatly increased [7] . Recently the same fate befell the music industry web site www.riaa.org [20] .
Sophisticated tools to gain root access to other people's machines are freely available on the Internet. These tools are easy to use, even for unskilled users. Once a machine is cracked, it is turned into a "zombie" under the control of one "master". The master is operated by the attacker. The attacker can instruct all its zombies to send bogus data to one particular destination. Simultaneously, the resulting traffic can clog links, and cause routers near the victim or the victim itself to fail under the load. The type of DoS attack that causes problems by overloading the victim with useless traffic is known as a bandwidth attack. This paper focuses on curtailing bandwidth attacks.
At present, there are no effective means of protecting bandwidths attacks due to the following reasons. Both IP and TCP can be misused as dangerous weapons quite easily. Since all Web traffic is TCP/IP based, attackers can release their malicious packets on the Internet without being conspicuous or easily traceable. It is the sheer volume of all packets that poses a threat rather than the characteristics of individual packets. A bandwidth attack solution is, therefore, more complex than a straightforward filter in a router.
A key problem to tackle when solving bandwidth attacks is attack detection. Detection of a bandwidth attack might be easy in the vicinity of the victim, but becomes more difficult as the distance (i.e., the hop count) to the victim increases. The underlying reason is that most bandwidth attacks are launched from distributed sources. This means that the attack traffic is spread across multiple links, which makes it more diffuse and harder to detect. Most of the existing solutions [27] [29] [8] [15] [18] [2] [31] to bandwidth attacks become less effective when the attack traffic becomes distributed.
There are two challenges for detecting bandwidth attacks. The first challenge is how to detect malicious traffic close to its source. This is particularly difficult when the attack is highly distributed, since the attack traffic from each source may be small compared to the normal background traffic. The second challenge is to detect the bandwidth attack as soon as possible without raising a false alarm, so that the victim has more time to take action against the attacker.
Previously proposed approaches rely on monitoring the volume of traffic that is received by the victim [18] [32] [3] . A major drawback of these approaches is that they do not provide a way to differentiate flash crowds from DDoS attacks. Due to the inherently bursty nature of Internet traffic, a sudden increase of in traffic may be mistaken as an attack. If we delay our response in order to ensure that the traffic increase is not just a transient burst, then we risk allowing the victim to be overwhelmed by a real attack. Moreover, some persistent increases in traffic may not be attacks, but actually "flash crowd" events, where a large number of legitimate users access the same website simultaneously. Clearly, there is a need for a better approach to detecting bandwidth attacks.
A better approach is to monitor the number of new source IP addresses, rather than the local traffic volume. Jung et al. [16] have observed that during bandwidth attacks, most source IP addresses are new to the victim, whereas most source IP addresses in a flash crowd appeared at the victim before. Previously, this observation has been used as the basis for a mechanism to filter out attack traffic at the victim [24] . In this paper, we propose to monitor the number of new IP addresses in a given time period in order to detect bandwidth attacks. We demonstrate that this is a more sensitive variable for detecting bandwidth attacks than monitoring the total volume of incoming traffic. In addition, we present a method for detecting changes in our monitoring variable, based on the non-parametric Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm [4] [30] . The CUSUM algorithm reduces the false positive rate, and has been shown to optimal in terms of detection accuracy and computing overhead for parametric model and have good performance for non-parametric model. [4] .
Our main contribution in this paper is a novel approach to detecting bandwidth attacks by monitoring the arrival rate of new source IP addresses. We show that this approach is much more effective than earlier schemes, especially when there are multiple attack sources and the attack traffic is highly distributed. We adapt the detection scheme proposed by Wang et al. [30] , which is based on an advanced non-parametric change detection scheme, CUSUM, and demonstrate that this approach detects a wide range of simulated attacks quickly and with high accuracy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives an introduction to distributed denial of service attacks. Section III gives a detailed definition of the attack detection problem. Section IV gives a detailed explana- tion of our solution to this problem. Section V explains CUSUM algorithm and the model we proposed for the bandwidth attack detection. Section VI presents the simulation results of our detection mechanism. Section VII discusses related work. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND ON DDOS ATTACKS
The Distributed Denial of service (DDoS) attack is a type of bandwidth attack, where the attack traffic is launched from the multiple distributed sources. There are two common scenarios for DDoS attacks, which we define as the typical DDoS attack and the distributed reflector denial of service (DRDoS) attack [22] .
A. Typical DDoS attack
As we see in Figure 1 [22] , a typical DDoS attack contains two stages. The first stage is to compromise vulnerable systems available in the Internet and install attack tools in these compromised systems. This is known as turning the computer into "zombies". Second, the attacker sends an attack command to the "zombies" through a secure channel to launch a bandwidth attack against the victim(s) [9] . The attack traffic is sent from the "zombies" to the innocent third-parties. The attack traffic could use genuine or spoofed source IP addresses. However, there are two major motivations for the attacker to use randomly spoofed IP addresses: (1) to hide the identity of the "zombies" and reduce the risk of being traced back via the "zombies"; (2) is to make it hard or impossible to filter this type of traffic without disturbing the legitimate traffic.
B. Distributed reflector denial of service (DRDoS) attack
Figure 2 [22] illustrates another type of DDoS attack called a distributed reflector denial of service (DRDoS) attack, which uses a third-party (routers or web servers) to bounce the attack traffic to the victim. The DRDoS attack also contains three stages. The first stage is very similar to typical DDoS attack. However, in the second stage, after the attacker has gained control of a certain number of "zombies", instead of instructing the "zombies" to send attack traffic to the victims directly, the "zombies" are ordered to send the spoofed traffic with the victim's IP address as the source IP address to the third parties. In the third stage, the third parties will then send the reply traffic to the victim, which constitutes a DDoS attack. This type of attack shut down www.grc.com, a security research website, in January 2002, and is considered to a be a potent, increasingly prevalent, and worrisome Internet attack [11] .
Compared with the typical DDoS attack, the DRDoS attack is more dangerous, for the following reasons. First, the DRDoS attack traffic is further diluted by the third parties, which makes the attack traffic even more distributed. Second, as noticed by Paxson [22] and Gibson [11] , the distributed reflector denial of service (DRDoS) attack has the ability to amplify the attack traffic, which makes the attack even more potent.
Our proposed detection mechanism is focused on how to detect these two types of DDoS attacks, which are one of the most challenging threats to Internet security [22] . For simplicity, we refer to these two types of DDoS attacks as Highly Distributed Denial of Service (HDDoS) attacks. It also covers the detection of some naive DoS attacks, such as attacks from one or a small number of sources. In this paper, as the first step to tracing the attacker, we focus on detecting the attack traffic between the reflector and the victim. Unless otherwise stated, when we talk about DRDoS attack detection in the rest of this paper, we are referring to detecting the attack traffic from the reflectors to the victim, which is the third stage of the DRDoS attack.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION
There are two challenging goals for our detection mechanism to achieve.
A. How to detect attacks in the vicinity of the attack source
Suppose the traffic volume needed to shutdown a network is V , and the HDDoS attack traffic is distributed over U links. It might be easy to detect the HDDOS at the victim, since V is significantly larger than normal traffic. However, the attack traffic volume close to the attack source will be indistinguishable from the normal traffic, since V U will become very small if U is sufficiently large. Previous DDoS solutions, such as probabilistic packet marking [27] and router pushback [18] will become less effective, since they are all based on the assumption that the attack traffic volume is very larger in the attack path, which does not hold for the highly distributed denial of service attacks.
However, in order to prevent the attack traffic from consuming network bandwidth, it is essential to detect and block the HDDoS attacks closer to the attack sources, thus reducing network congestion.
B. How to detect attacks quickly in the victim's network
As we mentioned in the previous section, detecting the HDDoS attack at the victim is not hard, since all the attack traffic has been aggregated and the victim will experience a high packet dropping rate and degraded service. However, it is too late to react to the attack at this stage. Victims normally choose to shutdown the server, and then contact the ISP afterwards, which is time-consuming. An alternative approach is to implement an automatic pushback control mechanism to block the attack traffic at upstream routers. For example, when a HDDoS attacks is detected by the victim, a message is sent to the victim's upstream routers. This message contains a description of the attack traffic, and a request to filter that traffic. However, to send the pushback message as soon as possible is extremely important to successfully defend against DDoS attacks. Consequently, we need a rapid detection mechanism so that the control message can be sent in the early stage of an attack. Although this can be achieved by simply lowering the detection threshold so that we shorten the detection time, this results in an increase in the false alarm rate. Thus, it is crucial for us to detect attacks accurately when the attack traffic is not large enough to clog the network links.
IV. OUR SOLUTION: SOURCE IP ADDRESS MONITORING
We propose a scheme called Source IP address Monitoring (SIM) to detect the Highly Distributed Denial of Service (HDDoS). This detection scheme uses an intrinsic feature of HDDoS attacks, namely the huge number of new IP addresses in the attack traffic to the victim. This novel approach has the advantage that it can detect attacks close to their sources in the early stages of the attack.
A. Overview of Source IP Address Monitoring
SIM contains two parts: off-line training, and detection and learning. The first part is the off-line training, where a learning engine adds legitimate IP addresses into an IP Address Database (IAD) and keeps the IAD updated by adding new legitimate IP addresses and deleting expired IP addresses. This is done off-line to make sure the traffic data used for training does not contain any bandwidth attacks. A simple rule can be used to decide whether a new IP address is legitimate or not. For example, a TCP connection with less than 3 packets is considered to be an abnormal IP flow. How to build an efficient IAD is discussed in detail in [24] .
The second part is detection and learning. During this period, we collect several statistics of incoming traffic for the current time interval ∆ n . In our detection engine, a hash table is used to record the IP addresses that appeared in the current time interval. Every hash table entry contains two fields, the number of IP packets and the time stamp of the most recent packet for that IP address, which is illustrated in Figure 3 . By comparing the current counts of the hash table with the IAD, we can calculate how many new IP addresses have appeared in this time slot. If the number of packets per IP address is larger than a certain threshold, an alarm is set to indicate a bandwidth attack. This is used to detect some unsophisticated attacks that use a small number of source IP addresses. More importantly, by analyzing the number of new IP addresses, we can detect whether a HDDoS attack is occurring. If an attack is detected, the on-line-learning is suspended. Otherwise, on-line-learning proceeds in the same matter as off-line training. 
B. The choice of a detection feature
The key aspect of our detection scheme is that we choose a completely new detection feature compared to earlier detection proposals. In this section, we discuss our choice of detection feature and its benefits.
1) Analysis of the available features:
Let us define the following three traffic scenarios.
• Normal traffic conditions represent the situation when there is no attack or network congestion.
• Flash crowds represent the situation when many legitimate users start to access one website at the same time.
• HDDoS attacks include the typical DDoS attack and the DRDOS attack. Let A normal , A f lash , A attack represent the number of packets, and B normal , B f lash , B attack represent the number of new IP addresses for normal traffic conditions, flash crowds and HDDoS attacks respectively in a certain time period ∆ n .
We define the network traffic monitoring point (NTMP) as the router where we collect the traffic statistics. For all the features in the above scenarios, we use the same NTMP, and the same IP Address Database (IAD) is used to calculate the number of new IP addresses.
Let us first discuss the situation when we put the NTMP close to the victim where all the attack traffic aggregates. As we discussed in Section II, for a typical DDoS attack, the attack traffic uses randomly spoofed source IP addresses, which will be new to the IP Address Database (IAD). For a Distributed Reflector Denial of Service (DRDoS) attack, the attack traffic uses the reflectors' IP addresses. Although the attack traffic is not spoofed, it is unsolicited traffic. The attacker directs the "zombies" to send the spoofed request traffic to some highly provisioned third-parties, for example, backbone routers, as observed in [11] . Thus, the traffic between the "zombie" and the reflector is easy to disguise in the high-volume background traffic. Generally, the backbone router only generates IP packets to communicate with other backbone routers using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) protocol [26] . Therefore it is unusual for IP packets originated from the backbone routers to appear in the monitoring point close the victim. Consequently, most of the source IP addresses of the DDoS attacks will be new to the IAD. A flash crowd event is similar to a DDoS attack from the traffic volume point of view. However, most of the source IP addresses of the flash crowd traffic have appeared in the network traffic monitoring point before, which has been justified in [16] . We can summarize these observations in terms of the following relations when the NTMP is close to the victim.
When the network traffic monitoring point (NTMP) is far from the victim, the attack traffic is very diffuse. For a typical DDoS attack, since the attack traffic from each "zombie" is randomly spoofed, almost every packet will be new to the monitoring point. Hence B attack will be large, although not as large as when the NTMP is close to the victim. For a DRDoS attack, the attack traffic from one reflector only contains one new IP flow to the NTMP. The treatment of this type of attack will be discussed in detail in the following section and we exclude this situation in this section for the simplicity of discussion. Hence, the following equations apply when the NTMP is far from the victim.
2) Choice of detection feature: From the analysis above, the traffic volume cannot be used to differentiate a flash crowd from a DDoS attack when the NTMP is close to the victim. Even worse, it cannot differentiate all these three types of network scenarios when NTMP is far from the victim. However, the number of new IP addresses is effective in differentiating the DDoS attack from the normal traffic condition and the flash crowd. The Internet is a very complicated and dynamic entity and it is nearly impossible to characterize Internet traffic by a simple model [23] [28] . Thus, we cannot use the traffic volume as our detection feature, since we can be easily mislead by bursty nature of Internet traffic, which means a sudden increase in traffic volume is not necessarily a bandwidth attack. Therefore, we choose the number of new IP addresses as our detection feature. 3) How to use the detection feature: We collect the IP addresses during each time slot ∆ n (n=1, 2, 3, ...), which determines the detection resolution. We assume ∆ 1 = ∆ 2 = ... = ∆ n , which means the time slots are of equal length. The choice of ∆ n is a compromise between making ∆ n small so that the detection engine can quickly detect an attack, and making ∆ n large so that the detection engine has less computation load because it checks the traffic less often.
Let T n represent the set of unique IP addresses and D n represent the items of IP Address Database (IAD) at the end of the time interval ∆ n (n = 1, 2, 3, ...). As we discussed before, |T n − T n ∩ D n | ,which represents the number of new IP addresses in ∆ n , can be used to detect the DDoS attack. However, |T n − T n ∩ D n | varies according to the position of the network traffic monitoring point (NTMP) and different ∆ n . We can normalize this value by defining X n =
, which will not be affected by the NTMP and ∆ n . Consequently, we use X n for our detection mechanism.
C. Implementation of Our Source IP Address Monitoring (SIM) Scheme 1) System Architecture: Figure 4 provides an overview of our SIM scheme. The SIM scheme consists of three parts: detection engine, decision engine, and filtering engine. The detection engine analyzes the incoming traffic pattern to detect any abnormalities. The decision engine summarizes the results from the detection engine and decides whether an attack is occurring. The filtering engine filters the attack traffic according to the identified attack traffic pattern. Note that there are two detection engines. The first detection engine is used to detect nondistributed attacks from a single source, while the second detection engine is used to detect highly distributed denial of service attacks.
There are two steps in the detection engines. First, the detection engine sorts the incoming IP flows according to source IP addresses, and identifies whether there is an IP flow with an unusually large number of packets. If there is, we activate the filtering engine to block this abnormal IP flow. This step is very effective for defending against some naive DoS attacks launched from a single or small number of sources. The second step is the core technology of our SIM scheme, which is shown in the shadow part of Figure 4 . This step is designed to to defend against sophisticated DDoS attacks and is described in detail in the following sections. As we can see from Figure 4 , the detection engine monitors the traffic through a passive (read-only) interface which is pre-configured with a non-routable IP address. This implementation feature can make the detection engine immune to the attacks since it is invisible to the attacker. When no attack is detected in the detection engine, a control signal is sent to the edge router 1 to stop the filtering engine.
2) Placement of the Detection Mechanism: Wang et al. [30] discussed how attack detection can be performed at either the first-mile or last-mile edge routers. Our Source IP address Monitoring (SIM) scheme can be installed at either the first-mile or the last-mile edge router, or both. However, each edge router can be both the firstmile and last-mile router, depending on the direction of traffic flows between the local network and the Internet, as shown in Figure 5 . For the packets going out of the 1 We use the term edge router to refer to the router that provides access to the Internet for the victim's subnetwork that we are defending. local network, the edge router is their first-mile router. On the other hand, for the incoming packets into the local network, the edge router is their last-mile router. Thus we can deploy the SIM in both inbound and outbound interfaces of the edge router.
The first-mile SIM of the edge router plays the primary role in detecting a flooding attack, due mainly to its proximity to the sources of the flooding attack. However, the detection sensitivity may decline with the increase of the size of the attack group. In a large-scale DDoS attack, the flooding sources can be orchestrated so that individual attack traffic flows cause only an insignificant deviation from the normal traffic pattern.
In contrast, the last-mile SIM can quickly detect the attacks as all of the flooding traffic is aggregated at the lastmile router. Although it cannot provide any hint about the flooding sources, a filtering engine, such as History-based IP Filtering [24] can be triggered to protect the victim. To bring down the victim under protection, the flooding sources have to significantly increase their flooding rates. However, this increased flooding traffic makes it easier to detect the flooding attack and its sources at the first-mile routers.
V. ABRUPT CHANGE DETECTION
In order to detect a DDoS attack, we need to be able to detect changes in our detection feature over time. However, our detection feature is a random variable due to to the stochastic nature of Internet traffic. Consequently, before describing the proposed flooding detection mechanism, we discuss the details of the theoretical background of our detection algorithm.
A. Change Detection Modelling
Internet traffic can be viewed as a complex stochastic model and any traffic abnormalities, for example, a HDDoS attack, can lead the abrupt change of the model. Our goal is to detect the change in the number of new IP addresses. There are two approaches to detect this change. One is fixed-size batch detection, which monitors the change of mean value every fixed time period. Another is sequential change-point detection, which monitors the variables successively. The latter is designed to detect a change in the model as soon as possible after its occurrence, which meets the key design requirement for our detection engine. Thus, we can model our task as a sequential change point detection problem. Consider the illustrative example in Figure 6 . For the random sequence {X n }, there is a step change of the mean value at m from α to α + h. We require an algorithm to detect changes of at least step size h and estimate m in a sequential manner so that the detection delay and false positive rate are both minimized. The random sequence {X n } can be formalized as follows:
where
is the indicator function, it equals "1" when the condition H is satisfied and "0" otherwise.
B. The CUSUM Algorithm
The CUSUM (Cumulative Sum) algorithm is a commonly used algorithm in statistical process control, which can detect the change of mean value of a statistical process. CUSUM relies on the fact that if a change occurs, the probability distribution of the random sequence will also change. Generally, CUSUM requires a parametric model for the random sequence so that the probability density function can be applied to monitor the sequence. Unfortunately, the Internet is a very dynamic and complicated entity, and the theoretical construction of Internet traffic models is a complex open problem, which is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, a key challenge is how to model {X n }. Since non-parametric methods are not model-specific, they are more suitable for analyzing the Internet. In our experiment, we applied the nonparametric CUSUM (Cumulative Sum) method [4] in our detection algorithm. This general approach is based on the model presented in Wang et al. [30] for attack detection using CUSUM. The main idea behind the non-parametric CUSUM algorithm is that we accumulate values of X n that are significantly higher than the mean level under normal operation. One of the advantages of this algorithm is that it monitors the input random variables in a sequential manner so that real-time detection is achieved.
Let us begin by defining our notation before we give a formal definition of our algorithm. As we mentioned in Sec IV-B.3, X n represents the fraction of new IP addresses in the measurement interval ∆ n . The top graph in Figure 6 shows an illustrative example of {X n }. In normal operation, this fraction will be close to 0, i.e. E(X n ) = α , since there is only a small proportion of IP addresses that are new to the network under normal conditions [16] [24] . However, one of the assumptions for the nonparametric CUSUM algorithm [4] is that mean value of the random sequence is negative during normal conditions, and becomes positive when a change occurs. Thus, without loss of any statistical feature, {X n } is transformed into another random sequence {Z n } with negative mean a, i.e. Z n = X n − β, where a = α − β (See the middle graph of Figure 6 ). Parameter β is a constant value for a given network condition, and it helps to produce a random sequence {Z n } with a negative mean so that all the negative values of {Z n } will not accumulate according to time. When an attack happens, Z n will suddenly become large and positive, i.e. h + a > 0, where h can be viewed as a lower bound of the increase in Z n during an attack. Hence, Z n with a positive value (h + a > 0) is accumulated to indicate whether an attack happens or not (See the bottom graph of Figure 6 ). One thing worth noting is that h is defined as the minimum increase of the mean value during an attack and it is not the threshold for the bandwidth attack detection. The attack detection threshold N is used for the y n , accumulated positive values of Z n , which is illustrated in Figure 6 . Our change detection is based on the observation of h β. Now our detection problem is to find the abrupt change in the random sequence {Z n } which is described as follows:
where a < 0, −a < h < 1, and other conditions are the same as Eq. 5. The formal definition of the non-parametric CUSUM algorithm is illustrated as follows:
, with S 0 = 0 at the beginning, and y n is our test statistic. In order to reduce the overhead for online implementation, we use the recursive version of non-parametric CUSUM algorithm [1] [4][3] [30] which is shown as follows:
where x + is equal to x if x > 0 and 0 otherwise. A large y n is a strong indication of an attack.
As we see in the bottom graph of Figure 6 , y n represents the cumulative positive values of Z n . We consider the change to have occurred at time τ N if y τ N ≥ N . The decision function can be described as follows:
N is the threshold for attack detection and d N (y n ) represents the decision at time n: '1' if the test statistic y n is larger than N , which indicates an attack, and '0' otherwise, which indicates the normal operation (no statistical feature change for the random sequence {Z n }).
C. Analysis of the CUSUM algorithm
It has been proved in earlier literature [1] [4] that if the values in a time series are independent and identically distributed with a parametric model, CUSUM is asymptotically optimal for a variety of Change Point Detection problems. There are two requirements to apply CUSUM to the aforementioned random sequence {Z n }. First, the dependence between random variables decreases with the increase of time. Second, the random variable is bounded by a finite value. This has been formalized in [4] [30] as follows:
• A: ψ(s), the ψ-mixing coefficient of {Z n }, approaches 0 as s → ∞. Let {Z n } ∞ n=1 be a random sequence on a probability space {Ω, F, P}.
, which is σ-algebra generated by random vectors {Z n } k n=j . The ψ-mixing coefficient is defined as follows:
where sup stands for supremum. As we see from the equation above, if the dependency among {Z n } is very weak, for example, long range dependent arrival processes, ψ(s) will approach 0 as s → ∞.
• B: One-dimensional distribution of Z n satisfies the following regularity condition: ∃H > 0 such that E(e tZn ) < ∞ for |t| ≤ H, which means Z n will not be infinitely large.
In [1] [4], the two conditions are described in more detail. Since the Z n is derived from the Internet traffic, where long range dependent arrival processes are common, the dependency among {Z n } samples decays as the time interval increases. Thus, condition A is satisfied. Since 0 ≤ X n ≤ 1 and Z n = X n − β, where β is a finite constant, Z n is also a finite value. Therefore, condition B is satisfied. Consequently, our detection variable Z n can easily satisfy these two weak requirements.
There are two key measures that are used to evaluate bandwidth attack detection systems. The first is the false alarm rate, which is one of the biggest concerns among the anomaly detection community. If a system produces too many false alarms, it will require lots of time to investigate whether the alarm indicate a real attack or not. If the attack reaction (such as packet filtering) is taken according to the false alarm, innocent traffic will be unfairly punished and normal network services are disturbed. The second is the detection time. One of the advantages for a bandwidth detection system is to detect the attack as soon as possible so that proper reaction schemes can be done earlier to minimize or eliminate the attack damage.
Unfortunately, these two parameters are a conflicting pair. It is hard to shorten the detection time and reduce the false alarm rate at the same time. Therefore, a tradeoff must be made between these two. As we mentioned before, CUSUM algorithm is said to be optimal in minimizing the detection time as well as reducing the false alarm rate [1] [4] [30] .
According to previous theoretical work [4] in the nonparametric CUSUM algorithm, the detection time τ N and the normalized detection time after a change occurs ρ N are defined as follows:
where inf represent infimum, and m represents the starting time of the attack, which are illustrated in Figure 6 . The relation between ρ N and the lower bound of actual increase h during an attack is described as follows:
where a(a < 0) is the mean of {Z n } during normal operation and h − |a| is the lower bound of the mean of {Z n } when an attack happens. Since the actual increase during an attack will be larger than h, the above equation provides a conservative estimate of the normalized detection time. The actual detection time should be shorter.
D. Parameter Specification
The two design goals, low false alarm rate and short detection time, are achieved by choosing the optimal parameters β and N . β is used to offset {X n } to be {Z n }, which has a negative mean a during normal operation. The larger β is chosen, the less likely a positive value will appear in {Z n }. Therefore, it is less likely that the test statistics y n will be accumulated to a large value to indicate an attack. N is the attack threshold for y n . The larger the N , the lower the false alarm rate, however, the longer the detection time. According to Eq. 10 and Eq. 11, N can be decided by a and h. Moreover, β = α + |a|. Thus, if a (the mean of {Z n } during normal operation) and h (the lower bound of the actual increase during an attack) are given, then β and N will also be decided.
As mentioned earlier, it is hard to discuss the optimality of choices for β and h given the lack of a parametric model for {Z n }. However, it is known that for the CUSUM algorithm the asymptotical optimal is achieved when h = 2a in one of its worst cases, a Gaussian random sequence [4] . This motivated us to choose h = 2|a| in our experiments, similar to the approach in [30] . In Section VI, we demonstrate the effectiveness of this choice on simulated network attacks. Based on a and h, we can determine β, the upper bound of X n , and the detection threshold N . First, we use Eq. 11 to determine γ, which in turn can be used to estimate ρ N . Next, given a required detection time, which can be approximated by the product of N and γ, we can obtain N from Eq. 10. For a given NTMP, we can observe E(X n ) = α under normal conditions. Hence, β can be calculated by β = α + |a|. Since α varies according to different NTMPs, we will discuss the value of β in our experimental evaluation.
When the attack traffic converges at the "last-mile" router (close to the victim), there is a large increase in the percentage of new IP addresses during an attack, which can be easily observed with h α. In other words, the change value h caused by the attack traffic will be large. Therefore, we simply choose |a| = 0.05, h = 0.1 when our algorithm is used at the last-mile router. For the last-mile router, the false alarm rate is low because of the aggregated attack traffic behavior. Consequently, we are more concerned about the detection time and want it to be as short as possible. Thus, we set the minimum possible detection time to be τ N = m + 1. If we combine this value with |a| = 0.05 and h = 0.1 in Eq. 10 and 11, we can obtain ρ N → γ = = 0.05. However, the attack traffic at the "first-mile" router (close to the attack source) is much more diluted. This is because sophisticated attackers can generate attack traf- Fig. 7 . The trace-driven simulation experiment fic from multiple sources so that the attack sources do not standout from the background traffic, i.e., the change value h contributed by the attack traffic will be small. In order to find a balance between detection sensitivity and false alarm rate, we choose |a| = 0.01, h = 0.02 at the first-mile router. For the first-mile router, the most challenging task is to reduce the false positive rate because of the sparse attack traffic. Thus, we let τ N = m + 3 and get γ = 100 and N = 0.03. All these derived values satisfy the requirement for an asymptotical optimal CUSUM algorithm. However, all these values can be adjusted to suit the local network conditions.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The CUSUM algorithm detects changes based on the cumulative effect of the changes made in the random sequence instead of using a single threshold to check every variable. Therefore, with the deployment of the CUSUM algorithm, the performance of our detection scheme will not be affected by whether the attack rate is bursty or constant. To evaluate the efficacy of our detection scheme SIM, we conducted the following simulation experiments. As shown in Figure 7 , we created different types of DDoS attack traffic and merged them with the normal traffic. SIM was then applied to detect the attacks from the merged traffic. The normal traffic traces used in our study are collected at different times from three different sources. The first set was gathered at the University of Auckland [14] with an OC3 (155.52 Mbps) Internet access link [13] . The second data trace is taken from the DARPA intrusion detection data set [17] . The third data trace was taken on a 9 MBit/sec Internet Connection in Bell Labs [25] . A summary of the data traces used in our experiment is listed in Table I .
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our detection feature and algorithm, we add simulated attacks to the normal background traffic traces in Talbe I. We embedded a 5 minute DDoS attack traffic with an attack rate of 160 packets/s in the Auck-IV-in trace on 19 March, 2001. Both the attack length and the attack rate are representative values that are commonly observed in the Internet [19] [21] . As shown in Figure 8 , we can hardly observe any sign of attack when analyzing the traffic purely on traffic volume because of the bursty nature of the Internet traffic. In contrast, we can easily observe a large peak caused by the attack traffic when analyzing the percentage of new IP addresses in the measurement interval. This is because the percentage of new IP addresses stays at a very low value during normal operation. This makes the attacks detectable using our Source IP address Monitoring (SIM) scheme, even when the attacks are highly distributed.
A. Normal Traffic Behavior
Auck-IV-in, Auck-IV-out represent the normal traffic behavior for a medium network (OC-3 connection to the backbone Internet), while Bell-I represents normal traffic behavior for an intranet (with 100Mbit ethernet connection to a local ISP). For evaluating the first-mile router SIM, we use the traffic which goes from the local network to the Internet as the background traffic. For evaluating the last-mile router SIM, we use traffic which goes from the Internet to the local network as the background traffic. Our detection feature is the percentage of new IP addresses observed in each 10 second interval (X n ). Figure 9 shows the behavior of this detecting feature when applied to the three traces. The performance of variable X n in the Auck-IV-out Trace (Figure 9(b) ) is more stable than in the Auck-IV-in and Bell-I traces (Figure 9 (a) and Figure 9 (c) ). The reason lies in the fact that the population of users within a local network, such as the University of Auckland, is more stable than the population of users who access that network from the Internet. Thus, there are very few IP addresses which are new to the IP Address Database (IAD). In contrast, the Bell-I data trace is bi-directional and contains the traffic from users outside the network, which results in its large variance. In our experiment, we use the Bell-I data trace as the background traffic for the last-mile router. Figure 10 illustrates the corresponding CUSUM statistics {y n } which are derived by applying our detection algorithm to the aforementioned three traces. Consider the Auck-IV-out trace as an example to demonstrate how we obtain the {y n }. The mean value of {X n }, which is E(X n ) = α, can be obtained by the learning engine using the traffic statistics before detection. For the Auck-IV-in trace, α = 0.0205. Since the implementation we are dealing with is in the last-mile router, then we use |a| = 0.05 and N = 0.05 according to the discussion in Section V-D. Thus, β = 0.0705, and Z n = X n − 0.0705. Now, we can calculate y n according to Eq. 8. According to Figure 10(a) , y n is very stable. It is interesting to see that there are some separated bursts in Figure 10 . These bursts are caused by the bursty feature of the Internet traffic. However, the burst for the Internet traffic is normally very short, which will not provide a large accumulated value as the attack traffic does in respect of y n . Thus, these separated bursts are far below the threshold N = 0.05, as shown in Figure 10 , which provides a large safety margin. Therefore, the false alarm rate in our trace-driven experiment is reduced to be zero. It is worth noting that α is updated periodically, in order to ensure that it represents the most accurate estimation of the random sequence {X n }.
B. DDoS Detection 1) Randomly Spoofed DDoS attacks:
We used the labelled DDoS attack scenario in the DARPA Intrusion Detection Data Set [17] as an example to demonstrate the performance of our detection algorithm. The DDoS attack we observed here is a naive one, which uses randomly spoofed IP addresses. The labelled attack started at time t = 3s and lasted for 5 seconds. Since the labelled attack is very short, we set the measurement interval to be 0.01 second. As we see from Figure 11 , there is an abrupt change in the curve, which represents the percentage of new IP addresses in time period of 0.01 second. Thus, it is obviously easy to detect the DDoS attack with randomly spoofed source IP addresses. However, this is not the focus of our detection algorithm, which is designed to defend against much more sophisticated DDoS attack scenarios.
2) DDoS attacks with a small number of randomly spoofed IP addresses: In an attempt to avoid detection by our scheme, attackers may try to constrain the number of spoofed IP addresses that they use. Similarly, in the case of distributed reflector denial of service (DRDoS) attacks, the number of source IP address of the attack traffic depends on the number of reflectors. Thus, the attacker can control the number of new IP addresses used in the attack. However, there is a lower bound on the number of new IP addresses used, since the number of IP packets for a single IP address will increase with the decrease in the number of source IP addresses used. Therefore, this type of attack will be detected by our first detection engine as we mentioned in Sec. IV-C.1.
To test the detection sensitivity for DDoS attacks with different numbers of new IP addresses, we conducted the following experiment. We used the Auck-IV-in trace as the background traffic for the last-mile router detection evaluation, and Auck-IV-out trace as the background traffic for the first-mile router detection evaluation. As mentioned before, our detection algorithm is not affected by whether the attack traffic is bursty or constant since the detection is based on the cumulative effect of the attack traffic. For the simplicity of the experiment design, we assume the attack traffic rate to be constant. The attack period is set to be 5 minutes, which is a commonly observed attack period in the Internet [19] . The attack traffic rate for the last-mile router is set to be 500 Kbps in order to constitute an effective bandwidth attack to medium-size victim networks, which in our case is the network of the University of Auckland.
Let W represent the number IP addresses in the attack Figure 13 respectively. We repeated the attack detection under a variety of different network conditions, and listed both the average detection accuracy and detection time in Table II and Table III .
As we can see from the simulation results, our detection algorithm is very robust in both the first-mile and last-mile routers. For the last-mile router, we can detect the DDoS attack with W = 18 within 81.1 seconds with 100% accuracy, and detect the DDoS attack with W = 15 within 127.3 seconds with 90% accuracy. Given the attack traffic length is no more than 5 minutes, only the attack traffic with W < 18 has the possibility of sometimes avoiding our detection. However, by forcing the attacker to use a small number of new IP addresses, we can detect the attack by observing the abrupt change of the number of packets per IP source address using the first detection engine which is described in Sec. IV-C.1.
For the first-mile router, we can achieve 99% detection accuracy even when there are only 2 new IP address in the attack traffic. The reason lies in the fact that the background traffic for the first-mile router is very clear. Generally, there will be very few IP addresses that are new to the network since all the valid IP packets originated from within the same network. Since the IP addresses in the IP Address Database (IAD) will expire and be removed after a certain time period, the IP addresses within the subnetworks which have not been used recently will be new to IAD. This is very similar to ingress filtering [10] . However, ingress filtering cannot detect the attack when the spoofed IP addresses are within the subnetworks. In contrast, our first-mile router detection algorithm can detect the spoofed IP addresses within the subnetworks if they are new to the IAD.
It is worth noting that we choose our detection interval ∆ n = 10s in our experiment, which is a conservative choice for a real implementation. If we decrease the detection interval by using more computing resources, we can reduce the detection time accordingly. Gil proposes a scheme called MULTOPS [12] to detect denial of service attacks by monitoring the packet rate in both the up and down links. This scheme is based on the fact that a router observing a certain packet rate in one direction with a significantly lower packet rate in the opposite direction can suspect that the slower side is unable to cope with the traffic it is receiving and may, therefore, be under an attack. However, this scheme assumes that packet rates between two hosts are symmetric, which is not always the case. For example, real audio/video streams are asymmetric, and with the wide use of online movie and online news, where the packet rate from the server is much higher than from the client, false positive rates will become a big concern for this scheme. MUL-TOPS indexes the IP flows using source IP addresses and assumes that IP addresses cannot be spoofed with the implementation of ingress filtering [10] . Unfortunately, this assumption is also not valid in the current Internet for the following reasons. First, some ISPs might not be willing to implement ingress filtering due to the overhead of the scheme or just lack of motivation. Second, ingress filtering is normally implemented in the edge router, and there is no control of the spoofed IP packets once they get through the edge router.
Wang et al. [30] developed a scheme to detect SYN flooding attacks by observing the ratio of the number of SYN packets and number of FIN packets. This scheme assumes that SYN packets and FIN packets always come in pairs in normal TCP connections. As it is also addressed in their paper, the attacker can easily bypass this scheme by sending mixed SYN and FIN attack packets. They also proposed to utilize the SYN-SYN/ACK pair for detection instead of the SYN-FIN pair, which makes it harder for the attacker to counter this scheme. This alternative has the following problems. First, it is very difficult to manage the cooperation between the first-mile router and the last-mile router. Second, this scheme is not effective for attacks that use non-adaptive protocols, such as UDP.
While the single denial of service attack is characterized by a large traffic volume, the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack is not only characterized by a large traffic volume but also multiple attack sources. Furthermore, the attacker can use randomly spoofed IP addresses to dilute the attack traffic volume per source IP address. This adds more difficulties to DDoS detection schemes that are based on traffic volume, especially when the detection scheme is deployed several hops away from the victim.
We propose a new detection scheme called Source IP address Monitoring (SIM) which monitors the increase in new IP addresses over a certain period. SIM is based on an intrinsic feature of DDoS attacks, i.e., the presence of a large number of spoofed IP addresses. By detecting an abnormal increase in the new IP addresses, we can indentify a distributed denial of service attack. Our detection scheme has put the attackers into a dilemma. They either choose to expose their identities by using a small number of IP addresses or risk being quickly detected by using randomly spoofed IP addresses.
The efficacy of our detection mechanism is validated by trace-driven simulations. The evaluation results show that Source IP address Monitoring (SIM) has both a short detection time and high detection accuracy. Moreover, due to its close proximity to the flooding sources, our detection mechanism not only alarms on the ongoing DDoS attacks but also reveals the location of the flooding sources. We have demonstrated the sensitivity of our scheme for detecting distributed denial of service attacks by investigating the minimum number of sources SIM can detect.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed a scheme to detect distributed denial of service attacks by monitoring the increase of new IP addresses. We have also presented a sequential change point detection algorithm that can identify when an attack has occurred. We demonstrated the efficiency and robustness of this scheme by using trace-driven simulations. The experimental results in the Auckland traces show that we can detect DDoS attacks with 100% accuracy using as few as 18 new IP addresses in the last-mile router and DDoS attacks using as few as 2 new IP address in the first-mile router. Our online detection algorithm is fast and has a very low computing overhead. Furthermore, our first-mile router SIM has the advantage over ingress filtering [10] that it can detect attack traffic with spoofed source IP addresses within the subnetworks. Our future work will include combining other network traffic statistics to detect bandwidth attacks and using distributed detection to detect DDoS attacks.
